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| 14. ABSTRACT Today, the United States is involved in multiple conflicts throughout the world. Our involvement is at least partially a result of a National Security Strategy (NSS) which places military forces at the forefront of foreign policy. Military doctrine and concepts focus on battlefield operations, not on the historically more difficult war termination - and not on ultimate triumph. Like war itself, war termination is both political and military, structured and unstructured, art and science. To realize national strategic objectives and develop a triumphant peace, operational commanders must shun the current vision of the U.S. Armed Forces, look critically at conflict termination theories, and expand the boundaries of operational art and doctrine. The challenge facing operational commanders after ending a regime and in the midst of nation-building is substantial. Although doctrine sees leverage as a critical ingredient in warfare, leverage is also a key element in reaching an acceptable war termination. Leverage may take conventional and unconventional forms. There is an appropriate saying about the military, "when you see yourself as a hammer, every problem is a nail." To meet the current strategic security needs as outlined in the current NSS, the military establishment must grow from a single tool to become a tool box. | | | | | |
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI**

**WAR TERMINATION:
DREAMING OF THE END AND THE ULTIMATE TRIUMPH**

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

17 May 2004

ABSTRACT

WAR TERMINATION: DREAMING OF THE END AND THE ULTIMATE TRIUMPH

Today, the United States is involved in multiple conflicts throughout the world. Our involvement is at least partially a result of a National Security Strategy (NSS) which places military forces at the forefront of foreign policy. Military doctrine and concepts focus on battlefield operations, not on the historically more difficult war termination - and not on ultimate triumph. Like war itself, war termination is both political and military, structured and unstructured, art and science. To realize national strategic objectives and develop a triumphant peace, operational commanders must shun the current vision of the U.S. Armed Forces, look critically at conflict termination theories, and expand the boundaries of operational art and doctrine.

The challenge facing operational commanders after ending a regime and in the midst of nation-building is substantial. Although doctrine sees leverage as a critical ingredient in warfare, leverage is also a key element in reaching an acceptable war termination. Leverage may take conventional and unconventional forms. There is an appropriate saying about the military, "when you see yourself as a hammer, every problem is a nail." To meet the current strategic security needs as outlined in the current NSS, the military establishment must grow from a single tool to become a tool box.

WAR TERMINATION: DREAMING OF THE END AND THE ULTIMATE TRIUMPH

“Tell me how this ends.”¹

Major General David H. Petraeus
101st Airborne Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom

“We won't know. We'll all be dead.”²

President George W. Bush

INTRODUCTION

After the surrender of Germany and Japan in World War II, the United States ventured into the role of the defender of liberty, peace and human dignity throughout the world. This role led to many subsequent conflicts, usually in cooperation with other partners and agencies in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the goal of each action was noble, the outcomes were void of the same splendid aura. Why?

The success or failure of foreign intervention is governed by the outcome achieved. The end determines triumph. The U.S. political/civilian leadership directs policy, national strategy and, when required, subsequent military action. At this point, the military becomes responsible, with the support of other elements of national power, for the achievement of policy objectives. Historically, the military has proven itself competent in attaining battlefield victory; however, all too often, an enduring peace after conflict termination seems illusive. Military doctrine and concepts are focused on battlefield operations, not on the

¹ Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 6.

² Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2004), 443.

historically more difficult condition - war termination and the ultimate triumph. To realize national strategic objectives and develop a triumphant peace, operational commanders must shun the current vision of the U.S. Armed Forces, look critically at conflict termination theories, and expand the boundaries of operational art and doctrine.

This paper was written after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and during the effort by the United States and its coalition partners to bring a peaceful end to the Iraqi War. It discusses issues directly related to this ongoing effort without directly mentioning aspects of the campaign. Much of the material concerning Operation Iraqi Freedom is either classified beyond the security level of this paper or too contradictory in the realm of political, military, and public offerings to support an academic document. Furthermore, this paper is focused on the military and what actions operational commanders and strategists might consider when seeking war termination. Most theorists and strategists agree that war is conducted by both the political and military establishment; however, although the U.S. Armed Forces task themselves with fighting and winning our Nation's wars³, America's diplomats do not. To win, the military must claim significant responsibility to successfully end wars. The following discussion reviews current U.S. Government military guidance and future direction, analyzes doctrine and theories of war termination and proposes recommendations for operational commanders.

FUTURE TRENDS AND CURRENT DIRECTION

Today, the United States is involved in multiple conflicts throughout the world. Our involvement is in large part the result of a National Security Strategy (NSS) which places military forces at the forefront of foreign policy. Current conflicts take on the aura of past

wars while reflecting trends in globalization, regionalization, and post-Cold War realities. War is now the genre of both state and non-state cliques representing a myriad of political, ethnic and even religious groups. Each of these groups is a capable belligerent and many will choose violence if not outright warfare to achieve their objectives. Cold War competition spread the means to create war to state and non-state actors throughout the world. These means fuel armed conflict which may or may not be centrally controlled. As a result, disassociated groups and individuals possess weapons which fuel violence, terrorism, and insurgency.

According to Professor Thomas Barnett, the world is divided into the Core and the Gap.⁴ In support of national interests, the United States, as a member of the Core, has the obligation to shrink the Gap through the export of security and other exports, like economic aid and democracy. The Gap's critical characteristic is "disconnectedness." The state and non-state actors within the Gap define the threat and create the dilemma for traditional conflict and, ultimately, termination. The state and non-state actors within the Gap are not connected to the traditional ways of war and conflict. Therefore, our ability to apply traditional war termination theory and concepts are now even more challenged. The United States must take the offensive to win our current wars and shrink the Gap.⁵ Because shrinking the Gap may involve war which is still "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,"⁶ military force will be used.

³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC: 2000), 1.

⁴ Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons 2004), 4.

⁵ Thomas P.M. Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map: It Explains Why we're Going to War, and Why we'll Keep Going to War," Esquire, (March 2003). Within this context, our invasion into Iraq constituted an attack into the heart of the Gap. From this invasion, America is forcing the Middle East face its own identity and place in globalization. Barnett correctly characterizes our occupation of Iraq as a "doozy" of a "baby-sitting job."

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1976), 75.

The ideas of Professor Barnett are reflected in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS reflects a uniquely aggressive and singularly contemporary view of the role of the United States in world affairs. In its view of the world, the U.S. military is called upon to sustain America's international strategy with potentially unilateral and preemptive actions in support of national interests and security. This strategy is both a defense and offense and reflects a world view after the destruction of the World Trade Center towers. Offensively, the strategy manifests itself in regime changes and nation-building.

Unfortunately, the 1997 National Military Strategy (NMS) is outdated (although still official) and reflects an earlier focus on peace and stability. Another Department of Defense effort, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), provides more current guidance for future U.S. military capability:

Assuring allies and friends of the United States' steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments; dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends; deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting; and decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.⁷

As stated above, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in *Joint Vision 2020*, reinforces the primary purpose of the Armed Forces to "fight and win the Nation's wars."⁸ This document emphasizes the conflict-minded and force-oriented nature of the military establishment through "full spectrum dominance." The spectrum of operations includes a broad spectrum of activities from war (combat) to military operations other than war (noncombat). Recently, according to The Joint Staff, "the United States will retain the capacity to intervene unilaterally," and "religious extremism and intolerance, failing states,

⁷ Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C. 2001), III-IV.

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, DC: 2000), 1.

competition over natural resources and greater economic disparity among populations will all be growing problems."⁹ The combined view from these documents shows an environment in which the military must expect to deploy overseas, possibly alone, to fight wars until an acceptable peace is realized, in distraught regions of the world and against potential state and non-state actors. This view reflects a change from the post-Cold War, 1997 National Military Strategy and is still inconsistent with the current NSS. In order to accomplish such missions, the military must transform.

According to the Secretary of Defense, transformation is "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concept, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and *protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities* [italics mine] to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world."¹⁰ Among other things, this guidance reflects partially on the historical truth and failure of the military during termination phases of protracted conflicts. Transformation guidance challenges the military to find new ways to wage war and peace. Current military vision and strategy needs review to meet the challenge of transformation and create innovative doctrine for "asymmetric vulnerabilities."

THE PAST REFLECTED IN DOCTRINE

Military doctrine is the foundation for military operations, training, procedures, and cooperation. Current doctrinal discussions of termination are limited to a handful of pages within a few publications that only provide broad guidance. Furthermore, terms such as war, conflict, hostilities, and combat are used interchangeably and in contradictory ways which

⁹ The Joint Staff, An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: 2003), 3.

hampers the understanding of war termination. The result is that the doctrine lacks unity. Doctrine states that "knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art."¹¹ The goal of military force is a concession (limited war) or imposed settlement (regime change) and gained with military leverage. This leverage is the key element to a lasting outcome and the prevention of a resurgence of hostilities. Doctrine further states that termination is relative to the two types of operations; war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). The military is capable of fighting and winning battles and terminating the opponents ability to conduct large scale or conventional warfare. Regrettably, this may lead our opponent to resort to other means to thwart U.S. strategy. Therefore, the discussion continues with the second type of military operation - MOOTW.

Fortunately, doctrine provides a wealth of information concerning the conduct of MOOTW. However, doctrinal guidance is often confusing when viewed from the position of an occupation force or while conducting nation-building. According to doctrinal concepts, the period between the end of the conflict (decisive operations) and redeployment of the last service member is called "post-conflict." This period is characterized by both combat and non-combat activity (not involving the use or threat of force), transition to other U.S. governmental agencies or another national or international force, and redeployment. MOOTW focuses on "deterring war, supporting civilian authorities, and promoting peace"¹² and stresses the primacy of political objectives. Although this all sounds good, further examination shows that doctrinal guidance concerning MOOTW is applicable in a transition

¹⁰ Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance (Washington, DC: 2003), 3.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), III-24.

phase (peace operations, etc.), but that little guidance is available for the operational commander responsible for strategic objectives during a "post-conflict" phase. These concepts certainly apply to an operational commander who achieves a quick decisive victory without lingering strategic or national interest or is conducting short-term contingency operations with limited objectives.

One other aspect of doctrine is relevant - campaign planning. Joint doctrine for campaigning allows the operational commander to integrate all instruments of national power during war and military operations other than war. Again, the doctrinal material is brief and repetitive concerning conflict termination. Doctrinally, the campaign plan should consider the first and last steps equally. The planners must consider conflict termination throughout the campaign with a process that views termination as a "part of a larger implicit bargaining process, even while hostilities continue."¹³ A possible problem might arise in regime changes with an absence of a credible entity with which to bargain. Moreover, planners are to "view conflict termination not just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new post-hostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems."¹⁴ Ultimate war termination is left unaddressed. A termination planning checklist¹⁵ is provided in *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures* (Joint Pub 5-00.2). This checklist is helpful, but brief (six items) in comparison to the voluminous checklists for other campaign actions. Consistent with the military's vision of its employment, doctrine is extensive in the areas of

¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, DC: 16 June 1995), I-5.

¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, Joint Pub 5-00.1 (Washington, DC: 25 January 2002, II-5.

¹⁴ Ibid, II-5.

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-00.2 (Washington, DC: 13 January 1999), IX-54, 55.

combat and short in the areas of non-combat use of military power. The focus is on military (combat) victory and not on contemporary shortfalls which assist with the final outcome.

THE PAST REFLECTED IN THEORY

Although termination is understood as an essential element of operational art, traditional military theorists generally only warn of the complexity and difficulty associated with ending what was initially essential to the policy and well-being of the state. Theory provides a limited ability to answer the complex issues of war termination. Although many attempt to model conflict termination, most of them fall into rational or non-rational approaches. The first group proposes that war is a logical extension of policy and, therefore, the termination of war is the result of logical calculations. The second group describes the difficulties associated with ending wars based on the complicated environment of war and offers possible approaches.

Classic theories of war termination mirrored the rational models of war. The political leadership identified the national interests and objectives, determined the threat and devised a national and military strategy to achieve the objectives. Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli were examples of classic theorists of war. Decisions relating to the conduct and end of the war were weighed against the objectives and the costs of the war. The calculation considered the opponent's position and objectives. Most conceded that war was never finished or that ending is difficult. These theorists assumed "that war termination is a discrete post-war process which falls in the political leaders' bailiwick."¹⁶ Rarely were the decision-makers able to acquire the information and knowledge necessary to determine a logical or cost/benefit approach to termination. Likewise, this approach was difficult when

considering that war is a clash of wills in which each participant's motivation and influences were indeterminate.

During the 1970s, theorists, influenced by the ongoing Vietnam War, still viewed termination through rational models. Although the Korean War had eventually ended with a return to status quo, terminating operations in Vietnam seemed impossible. The opponent acted irrationally compared to previous wars. Nuclear power and overwhelming conventional forces were unable to bring an end. Theorists considered the historical success of escalation, concession, deterrence, and appeasement in finding a solution to termination. However, government leaders were hampered because "they often implicitly assume answers to questions that they never examined."¹⁷ Military and political decision-makers were required to make estimates about the course of war based on mountains of data about friendly and enemy armies. This data rarely provided a view of the qualitative aspect of war, the will of the opponent, or the impact of other non-military factors or actors.

In the 1980s, again as a result of the failed effort in Vietnam, theorists attempted new models which examined the relationship between national and military strategy. These theories compared the complex political environment with the structured world of the military and offered recommendations. Solutions evolved around educating policy makers about the capabilities and limitations of the military. Clear, achievable military objectives became the goal from which termination was discerned through civilian involvement in military planning. These theories led to tenets and doctrines for using military force. The Weinberger "Doctrine" was one result and stated that the military must only be committed when vital interests are at stake, with a requirement to win, with clear objectives, adjusted as

¹⁶ Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3d ed (Portland: Frank Cass 2001), 195.

¹⁷ Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press 1971), 17.

necessary, supported by the American people, and as a last resort. These tenets would prevent, theoretically, the failure of Vietnam. The goal of these efforts only diffused the problem by pushing the issue of termination to political leaders. Because of the nature of war today, these theories and subsequent tenets have minimal value.

In the 1990s, the theorists continued with new models for war termination which consider the non-rational factors involved. These theorists began to deal with the realities of war which were shrouded in the proverbial fog. One model was proposed by Bruce Clarke. His models led to a conflict organization with six phases: dispute, pre-hostility, hostility, post-hostility, second dispute, and settlement.¹⁸ The genesis of termination flowed from the political haggling during both dispute phases to reach ultimate victory. Hostilities might continue as the conflict flowed between war and peace. These new theories were helpful and began to bridge the theory-strategy gap. However, detailed and extravagant campaign plans were still needed to address the uncertainties of war and the possible insurmountable factors in war termination.

Reviewing theories improves the operational commander's understanding without providing proven solutions. Moreover, history is replete with war termination failures and each situation is unique. In combination, however, theories and models offer insight into the complex factors and past failures governing war termination. Because post-conflict environments are extremely untidy and unpredictable, intuitive skills are possibly more valuable to an operational commander than the deliberate decision-making normally associated with war planning.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

Unfortunately the challenges faced by operational commanders after ending a regime and in the midst of nation-building are substantial. The discussion provided to this point only adds to the quandary and makes the ultimate triumph seem a distant dream. The U.S. military's position in war is simple to address. The military is responsible for conducting war and meeting the national strategic objectives in concert with other elements of national power. War is terminated once these objectives are met and the last service member redeploy. The first part of the war generally requires the military to fight; the second part requires the military to conduct a plethora of tasks and some fighting. To date, the military sees itself as a fighter. This vision is inadequate and requires a change.

There is an appropriate saying about the military, "when you see yourself as a hammer, every problem is a nail." To meet current strategic security needs as outlined in the NSS, the military establishment must grow from a single tool and become a tool box. The approach to contemporary warfare is similar to the approach taken to remodel an old house. A general contractor develops an intricate plan which integrates the efforts of scores of diverse craftsmen and laborers to accomplish the vision of a new, improved house. Like the contractor, the operational commander must orchestrate the varied limited resources, equipment, and time to accomplish the ultimate task. In the end, the mission is not deemed complete only when the last task is done and accepted. Military force is one "tool box" available to the modern operational commander. The plan for war must be just as intricate as the plan for remodeling a house with the final vision kept at the forefront of all efforts. There are precedents for this vision of the military.

Both the U.S. Army and Marine Corps developed techniques for occupation and nation-building duties prior to and during World War II. These procedures were outlined in

¹⁸ Clarke, 4.

the Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* and the Army's Field Manual 27-5, *Military Government*. The contents of these publications addressed issues as broad as law enforcement, courts, administration, utilities, trade, mines and quarries, employment, elections, and taxes. In support of military occupations and allied strategy in post-conflict phases, forces were organized and trained to govern occupied territories uncovered by advancing forces. The goal was to preserve military victory, aid in the transition to peace, and avoid a seam between military and political objectives. Other areas of governance were diplomacy, finance, economics, transportation, natural resources, defense, infrastructure and utilities, agriculture, and communications. This was an accepted role for the military who led the effort to democratize post-war Germany and Japan.

To meet the current and future needs of the United States, the military establishment needs to widen the scope of its operations. Many of the necessary skills are resident within the Armed Forces while more expertise is available through government agencies and contractors.

The second recommendation considers the use of operational art in war termination. Operational art, by definition, applies to the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Furthermore, a creative operational commander might consider operational art during the process of war termination where strategic, operational and tactical issues are compressed or merged. Within doctrine, leverage is "the centerpiece of joint operational art."¹⁹ Although doctrine sees leverage as a critical ingredient in warfare, leverage is also a potential key element in reaching an acceptable war termination. Leverage is attained in a variety of ways but ultimately allows the force to "impose their will on the adversary, increase the adversary's

¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1 (Washington, DC: 14 November 2000), V-2.

dilemma, and maintain the initiative."²⁰ Leverage may take conventional and unconventional forms.

Conventional forms of leverage in the post-conflict phase reflect elements of national power. Military force, actual or potential, is an obvious type of leverage. A large military presence scattered among every large and small urban area provides a certain amount of leverage (if not security). Less obvious are the strong military attributes of leadership, planning, administration and logistics. These aspects are a source of leverage in the chaotic and desperate post-conflict environment. The United States uses economic power, as leverage, to sway opponents to bend to our will. Monetary contributions go a long way in many cultures. Diplomatic and informational power provides other potential venues for leveraging an adversary to our way. Although these forms are conventional and traditional, they all have value today.

Unconventional forms of leverage might compensate for the United States' asymmetrical vulnerabilities identified in the Secretary of Defense's *Transformation Planning Guidance*. Consider what actions allow the United States to avoid conflict in the first place and apply these same actions to ending the war. There are two ways to prevent armed conflict; by removing the sources of conflict through conciliation or by determining that armed conflict itself is unacceptable.²¹ These two ways require that the adversary appreciate potential unfavorable outcomes of a war with a subsequent desire for other alternatives. Using conventional diplomacy and information operations may assist in convincing the opponent. Skillful deterrence, appeasement, and concessions reflect the adversary's goals and are another lever for a peaceful solution to a war. By following Sun

²⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), III-4.

Tzu's axiom of "knowing your enemy and yourself..." other possible levers materialize. By reviewing the value of United States' and an adversary's allegiances, norms, symbols, cultures, religions, races, ethnic ties and economic bases, the operational commander might realize initiative and momentum. These sources of leverage increase national power singularly and in a combined approach. To fulfill this potential, the operational commander must reach beyond the limitations of *Joint Vision 2020* and current doctrine and conduct operations, particularly in the final phases of a war, in a multi-dimensional and nonlinear manner. The result may be a new operational concept for the military.

Several actions work against successful war termination. There is a natural distaste for military governance in and outside the United States. Countries around the globe suffer military leadership from time-to-time and usually from a coup d'etat. Because "most military coup-makers lack the skills or inclination to develop their country's economic and democratic institutions"²² individual rights are repressed. Aggressive timelines become counterproductive if belligerents choose to wait out military and United States government involvement. Lastly, vague or unattainable grandiose political objectives make success beyond the scope of operations. These views reduce leverage and create vulnerabilities, possibly even critical vulnerabilities, for our adversaries to exploit.

Many changes are necessary in our joint vision and doctrine. These changes are beyond the normal duties of the operational commander. But much is within his responsibility and reach - the future of U.S. foreign relations, the lives of Americans, and the mission at hand.

²¹ Ikle, 108.

CONCLUSION

*"American forces can do many remarkable things, but they cannot provide permanent stability or create an Iraqi democracy. That will be up to the Iraqi people."*²³

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

*"CJTF-7 conducts offensive operations to defeat remaining noncompliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in the Area of Operations (AO) to create a secure environment in direct support of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Concurrently, conducts stability operations which support the establishment of government and economic development to set the conditions for a transfer of operations to designated follow on military or civilian authorities."*²⁴

Current CJTF-7 Mission Statement

The military is the most capable and adaptable agency within the United States government to plan for and execute wars. Requirements stated in the NSS and the focus on shrinking the Gap necessitates changes within the military. The President of the United States, through the NSS, states that "we will be prepared to act apart"²⁵ with the military and nation potentially alone on the battlefield. This difficult prospect might manifest itself in eliminating regimes and building nations - each requiring massive efforts over long periods. Because this type of war, and eventual desire for war termination, encompasses both political

²² John P. Lovell and David E. Albright, ed., To Sheathe the Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy (Connecticut: Greenwood Press 1997) 149.

²³ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Beyond 'Nation-Building,'" Washington Post, 25 September 2003, 33.

²⁴ CJTF-7, <<http://www.cjtf7.com/index.htm>> [7 May 2004].

²⁵ President of the United States, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 2002) 31.

and military considerations, operational commanders walk a necessary line between war and peace. Moreover, without a properly sequenced termination plan and appropriate resources, the operational commander might see an artificially created seam in operations and devastating setbacks in the progress toward the dream of an end.

The world and war are transformed. War between states is joined by wars with non-states. The Gap defines the threat and creates the dilemma for traditional war and termination. Globalization and regionalization blur the traditional distinctions of state-to-state relations. The same blurring is evident in the use of all elements of national power in war. The military is transforming to meet the challenges of the new reality. Transformation must extend to the joint vision, NMS, doctrine, and the scope of military operations. The military is the appropriate choice to lead our national security efforts with its operational reach and historical pedigree. Military power is irrevocably interwoven with other elements of national power and provides the operational commander a wide range of options in achieving national strategic objectives. Like war itself, war termination is political and military, structured and unstructured, art and science. By applying elements of operational art to war termination and expanding the view of military operations, the operational commander has a "tool box" of additional options to gain ultimate triumph and fulfill the dream. Failure is unacceptable.

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